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it had weakened the political system's ability to resist a faction that owed its power to royal support. Heshen's was, properly speaking, not so much a faction as a hyper-faction. It was irresistable while its royal patron lived-but, despised by the elite, it could not survive him.
But if literati had a part to play in saving the political order, how could their coordinated actions be distinguished from "factionalism"? Was there a conception of public interest, beyond particular interests, upon which broader literati support might be founded? Hong Liangji had asserted that more inclusive participation (to be achieved by the throne's search for advice beyond narrow court circles) would contribute to a stronger monarchy. His moralconfrontational approach was admired but may have served as a negative example to the generation that followed him. Hong's path, which had led him within sight of the block, was not taken by his successors. Reformer-activists of the next generation focused on practical problems of government: "statecraft" was their banner, not constitutional change. Literati activism, as it developed, addressed many of the prevailing ills in Chinese life, including the worsening economic crisis in the countryside. Yet the writings of Wei Yuan N (1794-1857), who was the guiding light of "statecraft," indicate that the constitutional problem lay not far beneath the surface of practical reform. As nineteenth-century conditions made a stronger state an urgent goal, the constitutional agenda was dominated by the question of how to reconcile more inclusive participation with more effective government.
I begin with the constitutional thought of Wei Yuan, because his views on participation and authority exerted influence well beyond his own generation and suggested how more extended participation might be reconciled with enhanced state power. I shall then turn to certain aspects of China's authoritarian tradition that made such participation difficult to achieve-even in pursuit of a stronger state. The reformist ideas of Wei's junior colleague, Feng Guifen , 1?4 (1809-1874), were bitterly attacked decades after his death, during the political turmoil of the 1898 Reform Movement. To what Feng had proposed thirty years earlier, the bureaucracy of 1898 responded in terms that reveal some of the basic premises of Chinese political authoritarianism. PARTICIPATION 
AND AUTHORITY IN THE THOUGHT OF WEI YUAN
What the political philosopher and activist Liang Qichao was to the twentieth century, Wei Yuan (mutatis mutandis) was to the nineteenth. Many activists of the Tongzhi and Guangxu reigns cited his views with approval, or even regarded themselves as his intellectual followers. Wei's ideas, like Liang's, were central to a trend of thought that was to have major consequences for China's modern history.5 Here I shall explore two of his concerns-participation and authority-that bear upon the constitutional development of the modern state.
A persistent theme of Wei's political writing is the legitimate boundary of the national polity: defining the part of the community that properly participates in national politics. In China, drawing this boundary has been complicated by the fact that literacy (or more properly, in imperial China, literati status) is much more widely distributed than political power. This is of course a condition not limited to China. But the poignancy of this issue in China, since the beginning of imperial times, is that the literati were trained to consider politics their special vocation-a vocation, I would argue, that has traditionally included a general interest in national politics, particularly the quality and legitimacy of government.
Yet the narrowness of the imperial bureaucracy insured that only a tiny fraction of literati could actually participate in government at any level. Here was the irony of the Chinese educational system: at least one component of elite education, that which dealt with the interests of the nation and the historical-theoretical basis of legitimate national rule, was training men to be concerned about issues which the state was determined to keep most of them out of. Men in office and men out of office shared a common literati status, but their actual power was grossly unequal. One might rationalize one's exclusion from power by sanctimonious, fastidious objections to serving in a corrupt or illegitimate regime. Yet when the state was menaced by foreign invaders and domestic rebels, as it was in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it became harder to resign oneself to the role of bystander.
Did the breadth of the polity affect the powers of the state? The liberal historian will assume that wider participation might imply certain restraints upon the central powerholders, including the throne. Indeed, in the imperial system of Wei Yuan's day, a suitable balance between arbitrary power and bureaucratic routine was essential to the secure pursuit of official careers. The coercive power of the state, moreover, could not be exercised so capriciously or so ruthlessly as to damage the social system upon which literati careers depended. How much the more would restraints be required in a wider polity! Yet Wei Yuan's times were not well suited to the moderate and temporizing literati style; instead they seemed to require a state that was stauncher toward foreign enemies, harsher toward domestic. How did Wei and his contemporaries perceive the relationship between enhanced state power and the breadth of the polity? The character of this relationship, as it is treated in Wei's political writings, suggests how the origins of China's modern state were connected to the constitutional issues of the late empire.
There are several excellent studies of Wei's life and thought.6 Here I should like to consider only those aspects of his biography that seem directly relevant to our present subject. Wei's early years had kept him aware of the social crisis around him. His family of small landowners and traders suffered from the economic disruption wrought by the rebellions of the 1 790s. His grandfather was personally involved in averting a peasant rebellion in his home county.7 He was also keenly aware, at every milestone of his own youth, of violent assaults upon the established order. In his preface to the Shengwu ji MAgE, a history of imperial military campaigns, Wei noted that his birth had occurred the year before the Miao uprising of 1795, that he had attained his licentiate the year the White Lotus rebellion was suppressed, and his first advanced degree the year of the Lin Qing uprising.8 His theoretical writings were those of a man keenly aware of the recurrent crises of a weakened political order.
Wei's public career illustrates the central ambiguity embedded in China's social order: between men in office and men out of office, the gradient of power was very steep; yet the gradient of social status was not. He himself held no administrative rank until late in life, and served less than a year in a minor office.9 Yet he was deeply engaged in the factional politics of the 1820s and 1830s under the protection of official patrons. To these patrons, highly-placed provincial leaders, Wei was linked by shared literati culture and densely-woven personal ties (his patron Tao Zhu, for instance, had been subsidized as a needy student by Wei's grandfather).'0 This ambiguity in the status system permitted the state to absorb, on its margins, talents such as Wei's. But it also raised the awkward question of how such political participation might be given an acceptable rationale, by which the mass of out-of-office literati could participate more actively in national politics. This question, central to Wei's concerns, became more urgent as China slipped deeper into her national crisis.
To Westerners, Wei Yuan has been an appealing figure, but for somewhat ethnocentric reasons. As the author of China's first systematic treatise on the Western nations (a work of strategic intelligence compiled during the Opium War) Wei has been viewed as "progressive" in his outward-looking realism. To generalize the experience and the ambitions of his particular social group, to give his own world view a universal significance, is the talent of a constitutional thinker. Wei's ambiguous position, closely tied to circles of great power yet never personally in command of such power, was shared by many literati of his age. It was his special role to distill, from such circumstances, a general significance and to express it in a universalistic rhetoric. Wei's constitutional writing is notable for its lack of attention to concrete programs for political change. This may seem strange in a statesman who was renowned for his bold, specific proposals about such institutions as the salt monopoly and the grain-transport system. In matters of deeper constitutional import, however, the practical methodology of change seems of secondary importance to him. His skepticism about the ability of legislation to influence human behavior would have been more agreeable to Burke than to Condorcet. Programs for changing the constitutional order would await Wei's successors. But Wei raised the main issue: how the state could be invigorated by more fervent commitment and more inclusive participation among the literati elite, and at the same time be strengthened in the exercise of its authoritarian rule. This seems a conundrum to us, but was not one for Wei Yuan.
Wei's constitutional thought drew its force from his realization that his own age was unique in Chinese history. After a century of population growth and commercial expansion, the early decades of the nineteenth century found the ruling dynasty in serious trouble. By the 1820s, the domestic economy was being ravaged by currency disorders, caused partly by a worldwide silver shortage and partly by the outflow of silver in payment for opium. And this economic crisis had already touched off widespread peasant rebellion, which now sounded a violent counterpoint in national affairs. The prestige of the throne had been eroded by corruption scandals, its orthodox cosmology and its local control challenged by heterodox religious sects, its competence cast in doubt by widespread breakdown of the flood-control system. In such circumstances, one resource that a conquest dynasty could not afford to neglect was legitimacy in the eyes of the educated elite.
But this regime was not well situated to rally support from the literati elite. It was a regime of insiders, with scant tolerance for literati policy-meddling from outside the ruling circle. During the reigns of the eighteenth-century monarchs Yongzheng and Qianlong, political combinations of literati had been condemned as factions and punished with ferocity. Accordingly, even the economic and social crisis of the early nineteenth century did not immediately evoke an active literati response. Such a response would have required that the elite overcome their deeply rooted political timidity, their scholastic apathy, and particularly their well-founded fear of coming together in support of public policies. A rationale for such a response, however, forms the central thread of Wei Yuan's constitutional writings. These writings were his Treatise on Scholarship and Politics, thirty essays that he gave pride of place in his collected works. "
Wei anchored his argumentation upon his studies of The Book of Odes (Shijing), a collection of ancient poetry that had become an orthodox text at the royal court by the sixth century B.C. By the time of Confucius, the Odes were a reference point for discussions of moral conduct and social practice, as well a safe way to criticize the powerful by allusion.
" What I translate here awkwardly as " Treatise. . . , " Wei gave the allusive title Mogu UV P. On one level, this simply means "Wei Yuan's writing-tablet": Mo being a component of Wei's courtesy name, and gu being a sort of wooden writing-tablet used in antiquity. The title's intended meaning remains a matter for speculation. Mo may allude to the Analects (7.2) phrase "mo er shi zhi" tiit,I ("listening silently and storing up knowledge"); and gu to a phrase inJijiou pian , a Han pedagogical text: "qiguyu zhongyi" *J14 . ("an unconventional work written on a wooden tablet"); see Qinding siku quanshu edition (Taipei:  Taiwan shangwu Wei Yuan's "Preface" to his major study of the Odes (Shiguwei 4 -&*; Ancient subtleties of the Odes) shows why he considered them relevant to constitutional issues. The Odes, he believed, were not to be understood (in the manner of the dominant "Mao Commentary") as having referred originally to particular persons or events of antiquity, in the conventional "praise and blame" mode of explication. Instead, Wei accorded them a signinfcance more general (we would say, "constitutional"): in them could be found guidance for the public life of the present age. This guidance could be discerned in the Odes as the superior moral and political insights of antiquity, including those of the anonymous poets and of the Odes' supposed editor, Confucius himself. Here Wei was following the "New Text" tradition, a minor interpretive school dating from the midsecond century B.C. In brief, this tradition of textual commentary attributed to the Confucian classics a prophetic intent to influence mankind's future, through the cryptic expression of "great meanings in subtle language." To return to the "New Text" understanding of the Odes, Wei maintained, "would reveal how the Duke of Zhou and Confucius showed their concern for future generations.
In this way the Odes could resume their rightful role as "writings of remonstrance" (jianshu -), both to rulers and to society at large.'3 In Wei's view, the Odes reached beyond the fleeting issues of day-to-day politics, to the very character of public life: it was material for a rhetoric that we may fairly call "constitutional." Wei's departure from a more narrowly text-based scholarship on the Odes earned him some reproach for interpretations that went well beyond the evidence. By the standards of the "empirical research" school of his day, such reproaches were certainly justified. The Odes and their music were composed in order to promulgate the sovereign's virtue and to transmit the feelings of the people. By guiding grief and happiness, by producing loyalty and filiality, they are the constant complement of public affairs. Therefore by disseminating them in both village and nation, men's hearts will be moved and the realm will be at peace."'8
The phonological and historical exegesis so prized by eighteenthcentury scholars, Wei believed, had actually alienated scholars from the meaning of the classics, particularly the Odes. The more transcendant significance of the Odes, the "hidden meanings," would change the consciousness of a decadent and apathetic elite. But exactly how were these "hidden meanings" to affect men's minds? The four functions Wei refers to were attributed to Confucius himself, who was explaining to his disciples why they should study the Odes.20 Their meaning in Confucius's day must have expressed the identity of his own class of lower-level elite, for whom the Odes were becoming a necessary part of a gentleman's cultural equipment. The language of the Odes, well memorized, could shape one's inward social feelings and give elegant form to one's outward expression. When we examine the references to these functions in the Analects of Confucius, it seems that none of them had a specifically political connotation. "Sociability," for instance, Confucius explicitly distinguished from "forming factions"(dang t). It probably meant a capacity to associate, with proper deportment, with men of one's own social stratum. But we may well wonder whether "sociability" may have served Wei Yuan as a decorous cloak for political activism. By the early twentieth century, Liang Qichao used qun in a similar sense: to mean activism in the public interest, free of the taint of faction.
But it is clear, at least, that Wei regarded the Odes as more than an elegant cultural template. Instead, they were to provide a galvanizing force for the elite of a decadent age: they would move the literati elite from apathy to public commitment; from social fragmentation to greater awareness of common identity and interests; and from prudent silence to forthright expression of opinion.
Wei's examination of the question, "What are the legitimate boundaries of the polity?" exemplifies his rhetorical use of the Odes. He begins from the assertion that, in politics, truth (at least, the contingent truth of our mundane affairs) assumes multiple appearances: "There is no single doctrine which is absolutely correct, and no single person who is absolutely good. That is why, in the Ode 'Deer Call,' the deer cry out to each other when browsing for food. "21 The poem to which Wei refers is conventionally understood to read: "The deer call to one another while browsing in the field; I have excellent friends. For them the lute is struck and the flute is Assuming, then, that powerholders should seek extensively for different views, whose views should they seek? Wei Yuan was quite sure that the common people had no appropriate role in politics, save as objects of rule, and in this opinion he was entirely conventional. But scholars (shli)-that is, literati who were not officeholders-were a different matter.
Exactly who was to be included in that category? Wei assuredly did not include those lower elite who had obtained only the first degree, the "students" (shengyuan 4tL), mostly rural or small-town residents, who were not even eligible for official appointment. The countryside, Wei assures us, is not a natural habitat for scholars. "When the sage kings sought scholars, and scholars sought The Way. it was definitely not in rustic places, but in walled administra-tive cities." There, "people are densely gathered, so a lively spirit is also dense; and a lively spirit means a gathering-place for talent." But the countryside was stony ground for learning:
The air of the mountains and woods is pure, but there are no Rites and Music, no teachers and friends for support. If a city scholar whose education is incomplete goes into the mountains, then he is abandoning the bright and luminous for the confined and shadowed. Thus a young lower-degree holder should stay in the capital city, and discussions of ideas should take place in the provincial academies.
If there should be a lower-degree holder who is talented enough to stand out in his rustic abode, he should be brought to the city, where provincial grandees can patronize and encourage him. Powerful patrons would never prefer a rural scholar to one whose urban connections and education made him part of the national elite. As the Ode reads, "From the depths of the valley, the birds fly to the tops of the great trees."27 Despite his rural origins, Wei's years in the provincial capital, and later in Beijing, had made-him a man of the city; his scorn for the "rustic"' lower-degree holders was entirely conventional for his era and his social class. Although China was even less urbanized in the nineteenth century than it had been a millennium earlier, the idea that urban elites should control rural bumpkins still dominated Chinese political theory.28
By believed that such heroic leadership was needed in periods of national emergency. Such a messianic view meant, to Wei, that routine functionaries, or "able officials" (nengchen #bf), were entirely unsuitable political leaders in ages of desperate peril (in which he certainly counted his own age). What was needed, instead, were "gifted officials" (caichen tr), men of large vision and stern resolution. For his part, the scholar's responsibility was to prepare himself for public service. But Wei considered the civil-service examination system to be worse than useless. (He himself only attained the metropolitan degree at the age of fifty.) How can the perils of the present age "be handled effectively by scholars who have come up through the hack schoolroom texts of the examination system?" Instead, the scholar should cultivate a relentless inquisitiveness about practical affairs: Suppose your utterances all concern "mind and nature," and your personal demeanor all "ceremonies and righteousness". . . but if you do not examine the people's ills, do not study bureaucratic management, do not look into the state's revenues and border defenses: then supposing one day you enter official service. You will be unable to manage state revenues, unable to pacify the borders, and unable to relieve the people's troubles.32
Entrusted by his official patron, the reformist official He Changling AR-(1785-1848), to edit a large collection of materials on government, Wei published in 1826 the compendium Huangchao jingshzi wenbian 1z?ftS (Collected essays on statecraft of the reigning dynasty), which was designed to engage scholars in practical questions like these. From the standpoint of the imperial court, we may wonder what benefits could be expected from this invitation to inquisitiveness, the suggestion that questions of high policy were the proper business of men outside government. Such an appeal for involvement of established literati in politics could never have occurred without the patronage of highly-placed officials. That as prominent a provincial figure as He Changling should have authorized such a project shows how reformist officials were already mobilizing political support outside official channels. Such a strategy, already a fact in the 1820s, was a precursor of the mobilization of literati outrage over the opium question a decade later. In both contexts, government repression of non-official literati activism was shown to have lost its force; and to have given place to a selective encouragement of literati political engagement. Indeed, by the time the Collected Essays were published, Wei Yuan and other literati were already intruding gingerly into the realm of capital politics: "Poetry societies" and other decorously-named literati groups (with protectors in high places) had been visible in Beijing since about 1814. They were to play an increasingly open role in battles over policy and official appointments through the period of the Opium War. In this respect, the Collected Essays were a public manifestation of a discreet private trend.33
By this point in our discussion, nobody could be faulted for conceiving a possible connection between the sort of expanded literati participation that Wei envisages, and a transition to some form of civil society, which would eventuate in greater diffusion of political power in society at large. Here, however, is exactly where we can envisage the power of China's own political agenda.
Two centuries of state-building under the Qing conquerors had refined the machinery of centralized monarchy to a point not seen before in Chinese history. The problem with this monarchy, from the viewpoint of Wei Yuan, was that it was run by too few hands, and not necessarily the best ones; that its narrow circles of power were increasingly ignorant of the nation's problems; that its enmity to factions had so weakened elite backbones as to make possible the virtual takeover of the monarchy by a single faction (that of Heshen).
During those two centuries, Chinese elites had been strikingly resourceful in sustaining their position by multiple sources of income, increased commercial involvement, and dense social net-works. Yet none of these assets could be exploited to the full without state certification of elite privileges and immunities through the civil service degree system.34 We can suppose (as the statecraft promoters evidently did) that events since the 1 790s made the centralized state seem more important than ever to the perpetuation of elite status. An era of overpopulation, economic crisis, and popular rebellion was a time, not for limiting state power, but for strengthening it. This last point was to emerge insistently as Western aggression made national security the central theme of elite politics during the dynasty's last years.
Wei Yuan maintained, as we have seen, an entirely conventional view of the basic division between an enlightened urban elite and a docile rural mass (a view that has survived to the present day). That the urbanized, established literati should be included more fully in the governing elite was not linked to a more general theory of political inclusiveness. As we might expect, his was far from a general theory based on innate rights. Instead, the rationale for expanding participation was not justice, but governmental effectiveness.
From a Western perspective, here lies the essence of the Chinese case: Wei repeatedly associated wider participation, not with limiting state power, but with enhancing it. As an example, consider his summons to the literati to put aside their supposedly principled distaste for practical government. To energize the established literati's political vocation required Wei to confront their well-inculcated timidity, as well as a certain moral fastidiousness, among some literati, about administrative service. Such fastidiousness could be expressed either as single-minded devotion to the joys of pure scholarship, or as a concern that "The Kingly Way," or government by moral example (wangdao IA), was impossible in the real world.
Wei's argument went directly to the relationship between means 34 The most sophisticated recent research on elite dominance appears in Joseph W. Esherick and Mary Backus Rankin, ed., Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). This work reveals the broad range of strategies used by elites to diversify their sources of income and ramify their social connections. However, an insistent theme in these studies is the role of "political capital" (earned or purchased degrees and ranks, and the human connections that came with them) in building and sustaining elite wealth and status (p. 105). And "only in relatively limited portions of the frontier can Chinese elites be considered totally apart from the state" (p. 340). I believe that this may somewhat understate the case. Wei's immediate point is that the grubby business of civil and military affairs will not sap the scholars' moral integritv, assuming that they have any. The more general implication, however, is that authoritarian government, with its armies, its courts, and its tax collectors must be judged by its ends, not its means. For rigor and ruthlessness, the well-intentioned ruler cannot be condemned.
Shall we then consider Wei as an advocate of remorseless realpolitik, a believer that men's evil nature is best controlled by "rewards and punishments," in the manner of the ancient Legalists? I rather see him as closer to the mainstream of imperial Confucianism, which drew selectively from the Legalist tradition. Rewards and punishments had their place, but mainly for the unenlightened commoners: "Punishments to deter evil conduct are for the commoners; commands to deter willful conduct are for the officials; ceremonies to protect virtue are the way for the sages and worthy men to govern themselves. "31 Furthermore, the power of government had natural limits. "Laws that force men to do what they cannot do, cannot stand; laws that forbid what men must do, cannot be carried out." And nothing but disruption could result from imposing sudden, radical change by legal fiat.37 Wei was born into the relative sanity of pre-modern China: government could not hope to achieve a fundamental transformation of human nature. Considering China's present-day hybrid system of authoritarian politics and entrepreneurial economics ("market socialism"), it is worth our notice that Wei Yuan considered strong government perfectly compatible with a dynamic private economy. Merchants' quest for private profit even appeared to him an essential ingredient of public policy. Official economic domains (the salt monopoly, the transport of grain) might be run by private merchants more effectively and with ultimate benefit to the state. Sea transport of grain to Beijing, Wei believed, would take advantage of the unprecedented growth of coastal commerce since the late seventeenth century, and would transmute merchant enterprise into public benefit. Capital for mining enterprises could be raised more effectively from private merchants than from government treasuries. Along with many of his contemporaries, Wei recognized the indefeasible claims of the market over social behavior. It seemed futile, for instance, for the government to issue paper currency, because even imperial decrees could not force the people to accept it. 38 Nevertheless, Wei Yuan was notably un-squeamish about coercion. In the hands of the ruler, power existed in order to be used: "To wield a sword but not cut; to grasp an oar but not cross [the river]: nobody is that foolish. "39 As he contemplated the chaos of his age, Wei Yuan placed his hopes on two visions, which seemed to him quite compatible: a greater scope for political involvement for the established elite; and an authoritarianism that would not shrink from emulating the "Hegemons" -powerholders so despised by moralistic Confucian historians, but so good at keeping order.
Shortly after Wei's death in 1857 emerged some of the characteristic themes we associate with modern Chinese politics. One was the "disinterested criticism" (qingyi &A) movement, in which highranking officials became targets of political attack for having appeased foreign aggressors. This agitation of "outs" against "ins" had begun in the aftermath of the Opium War, but became a major political force only as it became linked to modern nationalism. China's modern politics. In these comments on what is, even for today's China, a set of radical proposals, we are witnessing the impact of unusual ideas on the generality of officialdom. Though the reception of these ideas was not uniformly hostile, certain reactions show extreme sensitivity where constitutional principles were called into question. The alarm generated by Feng's proposals was not just a momentary setback in some inevitable process of constitutional change, but rather a confirmation of certain fundamental values of Chinese public life.
To appreciate what grated most harshly upon Feng's critics, we must consider that they were reacting to conditions that had greatly changed since Feng's essays were written. Repeated humiliation by foreigners since the treaty settlements of 1860 had generated an atmosphere of heightened political rancor and had afforded new opportunities for attacking the policies of men in power. Those attacks assumed the moralistic, confrontational style known as "disinterested criticism"; its practitioners, the militants of the 1870s and 1880s, were known as the "purist party" (qingliu dang &Fi5iX). This loosely affiliated group of officials denounced men in government for their appeasement of foreign powers (particularly Li Hongzhang, who had been compelled to seek terms from the French). The nasty innuendo was that appeasement stemmed from disloyalty and selfinterest.
Compared to Wei Yuan's conception of literati participation, however, "disinterested criticism" rested on rather defensive constitutional grounds. Indeed, it flourished at a time when reformminded officials considered that too many low-ranking men had already wormed their way into government posts. A leader of the "disinterested criticism" group, Zhang Peilun X , was alarmed by the hordes of low-status upstarts frantically pursuing government office:
Once the rank-purchase system was instituted on a large scale, a clamorous restlessness arose among the scholars, farmers, and merchants. Here we are already in the conceptual world of the modern nationstate, as mediated by the Meiji Constitution in Japan. Such ideas were only conceivable under the duress of imminent foreign conquest, or even (in the Darwinian world of 1890s imperialism) of racial extinction.
Hence by the time Feng Guifen's essays were circulated for comment in 1898, an entire generation of conservative opinion had been sensitized to the dangers of political outsiders taking unorthodox routes to political power, and to the mortal dangers posed to centralized monarchy by new, Western-inspired ideas of participation.
Here I shall sample the debate by exploring the reactions to two of Feng's essays-one relating to national institutions and the other to local-that embody the core of his constitutional thought. One advocates extending political participation by making high officials subject to election by lower-ranking officials. Another proposes a denser infrastructure of political control in rural villages. Both more inclusive participation and denser political control are salient elements of China's modern political history; yet in Feng's case, they seemed to be rooted in old constitutional concerns.
"Making the evaluation of officials a public process" (Gong chuzhi yi 'U1PA) is placed first among the forty essays, and its sweeping implications suggest that Feng saw it as a precondition for all that followed.48 Existing practice was to qualify officials through written examinations, and to choose among those qualified by relying on the judgment of a small body of high officials. "How could this do other than render 'talent and virtue' mere empty, baseless criteria?" Feng demanded. Surely the views of "a myriad men" were a more reliable gauge of a candidate's worth. Feng now proposed to make many high posts subject to nomination by the bureaucracy at large. Even low-ranking officials would be required to submit annual nominations for ministerial posts: "The Board of Civil Appointment would record [the nominations] and rank the nominees according to the number of nominations they received. When a vacancy came open, the men listed would be appointed in order [of their position on the list]. Anyone not nominated could not be ranked. " The power to nominate local officials would be even more extended, to include even first-degree holders and village elders.
The effect would be to reduce the power of high officials to install their personal followers in office, and thus make the highest central officials responsible, in some degree, to the bureaucracy at large; and local officials to the elites of their communities. Yet Feng makes no explicit case for the principle of representation, or for the limitation of power.
Feng acknowledges no foreign source for this proposal; and he cites a number of Chinese authorities that, he insists, fit the spirit of it. Yet we can discern a telltale track of his Shanghai informants: his assertion that, in weighing opinions, the thing to do is to count them. No idea is less congenial to the Chinese governmental system than that of equally-weighted votes, for the simple reason that one man's opinion is assuredly not equivalent to the opinion of any other; men are, after all, differentiated by both virtue and education. Yet, in our exploration of Wei Yuan's thought, we have already observed the conundrum underlying Chinese social structure: though political power and status were unequally distributed, the literati shared a certain equality of cultural status. In their effort to broaden political participation, both Wei Yuan and Feng Guifen emphasized the shared-status aspect of literati identity. The idea that all literati shared a common and legitimate concern for public affairs was a transitional concept of some importance in early modern politics. Before long, nationalism would add another component of shared status: common membership in a society that was coterminous with a national polity-that is, a nation-state. Here was a more volatile idea, one that extended indefinitely into the commoner population; and one that, by the late nineteenth century, was inflamed by a fear of racial extinction.
Reactions to this proposal in 1898 were almost uniformly hostile, but the grounds for objection were not trivial: they were phrased as a concern for public good over private advantage, and for principle over opportunism. Transferring such powers to lower levels of the elite would allow private interests to invade what should be an objective appointment procedure. If the state were to rely on the opinions of lower officials and the local elite, the appointment process would be skewed by "considerations of personal feelings and face. "49 Were not high officials expected to be impartial in assessing merit among their subordinates? If they "hew firmly to the public interest, then there will be no difficulty zetting good men."50
The pursuit of private ends would lead inevitably to the formation of factions, wrote Feng's critics. As soon as factions form to "promote the interests of their members," the chances of getting good men into office will be remote. Once the appointment power falls into the hands of factions, "nothing will be heard of the upright and decent" (who by their nature would shun factions).5" Only a small, high-placed group of officials can attain an objective view; bringing in the mass of educated men will make such objectivity impossible. Inevitably, "crafty officials" will all "flip the dust off their caps [preparatory to assuming their new posts] and congratulate one another," and the sincere, unassuming aspirant, whatever his merit, will have no chance at all.52
A related concern was expressed in the phrase "pressure tactics" (xiezhi RNI): a cliche in Chinese political writing. The fear was that officials would find themselves manipulated or blackmailed by those below.53
The proposal was harshly criticized by Feng's old patron, Li Hongzhang. who had known Feng well during his Shanghai sojourn. If the power to recommend officials were extended to lower ranks, then "everyone would have his private interest to promote," and the truth would never emerge. Because high officials already were responsible for evaluating their subordinates, they should retain the corresponding power to recommend them or impeach them. The impartiality of high officials, wrote Li, must not be swayed by pressures from below. Feng's proposal, he declared, "was modeled on the system by which the American Congress selects officials, without understanding its evils. [In that system,] those below seek their private advantage, those above protect their clients. At its worst, the system amounts to seeking office through bribery. Perceptive people in that country are already well aware of this. "54 What the critics feared was not some abstract diminution of the traditional appointive power, but a political system dominated by factional strife, a scramble for advantage, and the exaltation of purely private ends. In such a system, they insisted, not the cream but 51 Wang Zhensheng E comments. 52 Puqiu comments. 5 Lai Qingjian AiW comments. 54 Li Hongzhang comments. the scum would rise to the surface. We must regard this fear as the deeply-ingrained attitude of a tiny, privileged elite, which understood its monopoly of political power through the mandarin premise: that education raised men above petty, private considerations; and that high officials specially qualified by education must therefore embody a purer view of the public interest than those below them. The inevitable exceptions were to be dealt with by the existing system, in which all superior officials were in theory held personally accountable for the behavior of men whom they recommended, as well as for impeaching improper conduct among subordinates. At the apex of the system, anchoring the system in the purest publicmindedness, was the monarch, who presumably owed favors to no man. That partiality and factions flourished in actual practice, did not make them acceptable in theory.
In his proposal on official appointments, Feng was advocating an expanded political role for the lower bureaucracy and local literati. To deal with the dangerous volatility of local society, he aimed directly at the problem of predatory middlemen: the hustlers who had inserted themselves into local government as a way of making money. His essay, "On restoring the system of local headmen," (Fu xiangzhi yi &NUM) was inspired by a familiar example from late antiquity: the rural government system of the Qin and Han periods, in which "district" and "neighborhood" officers formed a fine network of control in the villages, a system admired by Feng's seventeenth-century mentor Gu Yanwu.
Over the centuries of imperial history, no constitutional issue has generated more heat than the proper character of rural government: how were the interests of the state and the local communities to be balanced? Were natural, communitarian organizations (the lineage, the local cult, the village elders) the best instruments for ordering society and nourishing the state? Would it be necessary to use a government-supervised system of mutual responsibility, or a more ramified bureaucracy? How could the power of local elites be socialized to accord with the purposes of the state? Such questions gained urgency from the population pressure, the economic insecurity, and the smoldering popular temper of the nineteenth century.
Feng's proposal for rural government must be viewed in the light of his overriding concern to rationalize the rural tax system and so preclude peasant rebellion. Reducing special privilege and breaking the power of the Grain Transport Administration were vital first steps. But even tax reform would not solve the problem of how to harmonize relations between officials and commoners. The rebellious temper of the countryside required a mechanism to build trust, mediate legal cases, and defuse explosive situations. Feng's solution was a new kind of middleman, who would be chosen by the villagers themselves through paper ballots. Like Wei Yuan, Feng had been inspired by the writings of the seventeenth-century scholar Gu Yanwu. Gu's famous dictum, "When high officials are numerous, the age will be in decline; when lesser officials are numerous, the age will flourish" was considered admirable but visionary (how could all those lower officials be fed and supervised?)55 Yet Feng believed that the pressures of China's overcrowded village society required something better than the informal delegation of power to local bosses. Surely the solution was not to expand the numbers of sub-county "assistants" (li-yuan 3m), whose social origins Feng considered "miscellaneous" and whose aspirations were "undistinguished." Such men, often from distant places, obtained their rank by purchase and depended wholly on what money they could scrape from their jobs. They "act like dogs and horses to the rich and treat the poor as fish and meat." It was such as they, along with the notorious clerks, who had so disastrously commercialized local government.
The solution Feng proposed was to use local men whom the populace would trust because they had chosen them. They would have quasi-official status but would be chosen by groups of 100 and 1000 households. Nominees would be drawn from the level beneath the mistrusted first-degree holders. Here again was the unmistakable imprint of the West: each villager was to write his name and his nominee on a slip of paper; the slips would be counted, and the man with the most slips would be appointed.
The 1898 May we not, finally, look beyond the usual "conservative" or "reactionary" labels in our efforts to understand Feng's critics, and through them the backlash against the 1898 reformers? We are verging here, I would suggest, upon the inner core of Chinese authoritarianism, a system of beliefs about human behavior that did not necessarily dissolve with the emergence of the modern state.
Why did public authorities exist? Surely to keep private interests in check. The belief was founded on a conviction that public values were not adequately internalized to permit people to pursue their private interests unchecked. It follows that political competition and the resulting factional struggle can only result in damage to the public interest. Only the regular bureaucracy can prevent the elite as a whole from exercising illegitimate power in pursuit of private interests. Only the upper layers of the ruling group can attain the kind of objectivity needed to keep the bureaucracy as a whole from pursuing private or factional ends. And at the very top, only the emperor can ensure that the system as a whole is directed toward the public interest. These assumptions in turn assume that the higher the official rank, the more objective the view of the public interest.
The critics' social vision was a bleak one. It was summed up in the conventional lament, "The nature of the people (or of the age) is not that of antiquity. " By this was meant that present-day society was a long way from the classical vision of ancient society as a utopia in which every man had a natural concern for the public interest. Public values were so internalized that authoritarian coercion was unnecessary. But in the present age, authority was needed to keep private interests in check. Assuming that top officials would do so presents a vexing problem: how could you be sure that top officials were not, themselves, acting on behalf of private interests? The problem ceased to exist if you believed that higher officials would inevitably have a more objective view of the public interest than lower ones, and that the bureaucracy as a whole would have a more objective view than mere private persons. This view was reinforced by the moralistic assumptions about factional activity. It was believed that only base motives could lead men to join factions. Factional selfpromotion is identified with a certain character type, the "crafty official" (qiaohuan 7iWI). A decent, sincere, self-respecting man would not compete that way. The business of "getting ahead," through patronage and favoritism, though universally practiced, was never publicly approved. So factions were not bad just because they divided the polity, but because those who join them are likely to be scoundrels. By a charming illogic, because high officials were likely to be worthy men, they could not have attained their positions by behaving like scoundrels! Though lower bureaucrats were supposed to be controlled by their superiors, the greatest threat to the public interest was seen to lie outside the bureaucracy: in the multiple strata of middlemen who competed for public resources. These middlemen always threatened to arrogate to themselves, for private gain, powers that properly belonged to the bureaucracy. Giving authority to a new stratum of quasi-bureaucrats in local society, as Feng proposed, was just asking for trouble. Such men would inevitably wield illegitimate power (I think that is how we must understand the terms xiezhii and bachi th4,) at the expense of the public interest. The lowly firstdegree holders, who were not fully subject to bureaucratic discipline, were particularly suspect.
Feng himself would have understood this line of reasoning.
He was well aware of the danger of unchecked local power. His program for rebuilding local society was a step away from the unregulated rule of local militia-leaders and "gentry managers" (officially-sanctioned local bosses). With firm ties to the upper bureaucracy, Feng was no liberal; nor do his writings reveal any sense whatever of popular sovereignty or popular rights. His position was, however, close to that of his intellectual forerunner, Wei Yuan, in that he believed that the public interest was more widely internalized, among the elite, than conventional wisdom assumed. But consider the late-century scene as Feng's critics must have done. The mid-century rebellions had been suppressed, but at a terrible cost. The government's authority had been dangerously diluted. At the top was an uneasy alliance between the court and powerful provincial leaders. Control over the land-tax had, to some extent, been lost to private middlemen. Within the elite itself, the power of private wealth (through the purchase of ranks and offices) had dangerously increased. Privatization of public resources was rampant on every level of government. In these circumstances, to re-establish the authority of the regular bureaucracy was the way to keep Chinese society from total breakdown. Proposals to distribute power more widely must have seemed to invite chaos and corruption everywhere. The principled response was to seek greater objectivity and firmer enforcement of public interest over private. If the public interest was not dominant in every man's mind, what but bureaucratic control could hold anarchy at bay?
The idea that there exists a "public interest, " as distinct from the sum of private interests, seems an anachronism in the modern world. The liberal democracies have largely lost the capacity even to express such a view. Bizarre as the conception of "public interest" may seem in contemporary America, that conception was a dominant theme in the early republic. Although there was lively disagreement as to how such a "public interest" or "public good" might be realized in the practice of government, its existence was not seriously doubted.
The great vehicle for popularizing the principles of the proposed new Constitution of 1787, The Federalist, provides abundant examples of this faith. For our present purposes, the essential question addressed by the essays that make up The Federalist is how to reconcile the public interest with a multiplicity of private interests. Private interests, expressed through "factions," would always exist among the populace. In his celebrated essay number 10 James Madison wrote that one of the advantages of "a well-constructed Union" was that it tended "to break and control the violence of faction. "63 Popular government had been criticized because "the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties," and that "an interested and overbearing majority" would promote its aims in defiance of the public and of legitimate minority interests. Madison elaborated: "By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." "Factions," however, Madison believed to be a constant presence in society. Though they are by nature "adverse" to the public interest, their causes are "sown in the nature of man." Government could not protect the public interest by stamping them out, which would erase liberty itself. Nor could the public interest be made universal by changing (or as the Chinese would say, "transforming"; hua IL) the character of the citizenry, "by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests," which was impossible, given the "diversity in the faculties of men." Despite Madison's pessimistic view of faction as an irrepressible outgrowth of human nature, his remedy was astonishingly sanguine. Citizens might have their private interests, but they had also an innate civic consciousness. However vulnerable to the forces of passion and private interest, ordinary men had the civic sense to recognize "men of virtue and wisdom" as their proper representatives.64 In a republic big enough, the passions of faction would be filtered through these "men of virtue and wisdom," whose elevated Madison's resort to men who, by their "virtue and wisdom" are better suited than their compatriots to discern the public interest, has led critics to label him elitist; and the connection of "virtue and wisdom" to high public office would not have seemed unreasonable to an imperial mandarin. If Madison was not offering a "Chinese" solution of "enlightened statesmen," he yet persisted in his belief that some men are more likely than others to discern the public interest. By virtue of their position, the people's representatives "may best discern the true interest of their country," and their "patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. ''65 Yet in their conceptions of the public interest, Madison and the mandarins differed on a crucial point. Madison's representative principle rested on the premise that civic virtue-though specially concentrated in men of virtue and wisdom-was in fact widespread among the populace, even though in a form less refined. Republicanism depended on it: without "virtue in the people," good government was inconceivable.66 So the character of the people was, in its civic sense (as the Chinese would say) "equal to that of antiquity. " This essential quality, which made representative government possible, also precluded a fundamental distinction between rulers and ruled.
By contrast, the pessimism of Feng's mandarin critics precludes even the possibility of effective representation. If ordinary men lacked civic sense, they might rightly be feared by guardians of the public interest. If even officials were so vulnerable to the blandishments of faction-leaders that they could not be trusted to express opinions on the leadership, how much less trustworthy the commoners? Without civic virtue, villagers and bureaucrats alike would easily be deceived by the wiles of ambitious villains. With civic virtue so unevenly distributed, a government of superior men is needed to 65 "transform" the mass of the people. Madison, by contrast, considers "the present genius of the people of America" as quite incapable of electing a body of representatives "who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. ' '67 Was civic virtue really so rare among ordinary Chinese? Wei Yuan, as we have seen, believed that beneath the apathetic style of his literati contemporaries lay a capacity to be roused in defense of the public interest. Moreover, there is abundant evidence in the local scene that concern for the public interest was not only thriving, but even served as an emblem of legitimate elite status. County gazetteers display, besides local pride, concrete commitments to public interest in the form of charity and the management of public services. A wealthy merchant could signify his membership in the local elite, not only by buying ranks and titles, but by performing such "good works" (shanxing A71) as would earn him a biographical notice in the county gazetteer and a space on the engraved stele of the local temple association. Nor was natural civic virtue neglected by Chinese political writers. Although the blissful altruism of "antiquity" remained a remote vision, the natural affection of men for their home communities might yet prove the firmest surety for good government. The most celebrated expression of this view, and that most often cited in the last decades of the empire, was On the System of bureaucratic government (Junxian lun ;TMA-) by Gu Yanwu.
But if there was believed to be some degree of immanent civic virtue among ordinary Chinese, it apparently was thought to work best in a local setting. To conceive of it on the national scale-the arena of greatest concern to Feng Guifen's critics-proved exceedingly difficult. It was as if the hometown civism that might work for good government in a county, would become a deformed and destructive factor in a national setting.68 It may have been this old, 67 The Federalist No. 55, p. 363. 68 One is reminded here of Montesquieu's assumption that republican virtue, as a concern for public over private interests, could exist only in a small political framework. Yet may we not also concede to Feng's critics a degree of seriousness about the future of their world, given what they considered the fragility of the public interest in their era? Lacking representative government, which few Chinese of the time could even conceive of, what was to insure that the public interest was protected? One reasonable solution (the one that most twentieth-century Chinese governments have adopted) was to strengthen bureaucratic control, and thereby to ensure the kind of higher objectivity that could rise above narrow, private interests. Lacking alternatives, authoritarian leadership by regular bureaucrats seemed entirely reasonable to these men. In such a conception we may be glimpsing that obdurate core of authoritarianism that has made a civic order so hard for China to achieve.
The bureaucratic-authoritarian approach can be distinguished from those which hold that (1) social norms are so internalized that everyone, on whatever level, will have the public interest in mind, and hence authoritarian leadership is not needed; or (2) that private selfish interests, when aggregated, will tend to produce a public interest (the "invisible hand"); or (3) that the majority power should prevail, whatever its effect on the rest of society, and that no abstract "public interest" exists. In the liberal democracies, these three last views coexist in uneasy balance. Feng Guifen's critics believed the first to be a beautiful but vain illusion ("The people's nature is not that of antiquity"). They regarded the second as an absurd fallacy, and presumably would have regarded the third-if they could even have imagined it-as a vision of hell. A society ruled by selfish interests, in which opportunism always conquers principle, in which power and money crush all other human concerns, in which the political process raises incompetent or wicked men to positions of leadership: who would want to live there?
